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Well prior to the invention of the term ‘biology’ in the early 1800s by Lamarck 
and Treviranus, and also prior to the appearance of terms such as ‘organism’ 
under the pen of Leibniz in the early 1700s, the question of ‘Life’, that is, the 
status of living organisms within the broader physico-mechanical universe, 
agitated different corners of the European intellectual scene. From modern 
Epicureanism to medical Newtonianism, from Stahlian animism to the 
discourse on the ‘animal economy’ in vitalist medicine, models of living being 
were constructed in opposition to ‘merely anatomical’, structural, mechanical 
models. It is therefore curious to turn to the ‘passion play’ of the Scientific 
Revolution – whether in its early, canonical definitions or its more recent, 
hybridized, reconstructed and expanded versions: from Koyré to Biagioli, from 
Merton to Shapin – and find there a conspicuous absence of worry over what 
status to grant living beings in a newly physicalized universe. Neither Harvey, 
nor Boyle, nor Locke (to name some likely candidates, the latter having studied 
with Willis and collaborated with Sydenham) ever ask what makes organisms 
unique, or conversely, what does not. In this paper I seek to establish how ‘Life’ 
became a source of contention in early modern thought, and how the Scientific 
Revolution missed the controversy. 
 
 
 
“Of all natural forces, vitality is the incommunicable one.”1
F. Scott Fitzgerald 
 
 
 Introduction 
                                                 
* Thanks to Guido Giglioni, Justin E.H. Smith and Sean Dyde for assistance and suggestions. 
 
1 Fitzgerald (1945), p. 74. 
 1
To ask why there was no controversy over Life – that is, debates specifically focusing on the 
status of living beings, their mode of functioning, their internal mechanisms and above all their 
‘uniqueness’ within the physical universe as a whole – in the Scientific Revolution is to 
simultaneously run the risk of extreme narrowness of detail and/or of excessive breadth in 
scope. That is, if we take the question ‘why?’ at face value, a succinct answer can be given right 
away: the Scientific Revolution was an intellectual construct that we owe chiefly to Alexandre 
Koyré and Herbert Butterfield, and it was entirely focused on the physico-mechanical sciences; 
the latter focus was never modified by one iota in the successive historiographic reassessments 
of this episode which emphasized notably its Puritan, gentlemanly or courtly roots,2 and said 
not a word about the life sciences. Hence our concept of the Scientific Revolution does not 
include debates over generation, semina rerum, species, anatomy, vivisection, animal souls, 
irritability and so forth.3 Conversely, the title question appears enormous and unmanageable 
once we realize that it implies many others: 
(i) if Life was not a topic of controversy in and for the Scientific Revolution, when did it 
become one?  
This question requires that we decide what counts as a controversy; for surely debates between 
Harvey and Riolan on the heart, or Whytt and Haller on irritability, do not meet the criteria for 
a ‘strong’ definition of a controversy in the history of science, as “part of the collective 
production of knowledge … the very lifeblood of science, one of the most productive factors 
in scientific development.”4
(ii) How should we then understand the various activities that existed at the time, from 
anatomy and physiology (or the study of the ‘animal economy’) to medicine overall, 
as well as natural history, botany, chemistry?5 
Notice that even when we discard monolithic concepts of the Scientific Revolution and adopt 
a much more nuanced approach to the disciplinary status and diversity of natural philosophy, 
                                                 
2 A partial exception would be Kuhn (1976) precisely because he introduces a distinction between Baconian-
inductive programmes in natural philosophy and more mathematically oriented programmes. As recently as 
Biagioli (1998) the standard picture which disregards the life sciences is still reiterated, only now with a 
constructivist flourish that has accents of épater le bourgeois: we learn that historians of science still need the concept 
of the Scientific Revolution to preserve their employment. 
3 It is a mark of the extreme provincialism of the history and philosophy of early modern science that it is so 
preoccupied with endless internal controversies over externalism and internalism, the role of the Church, or the 
replicability of an experimentum crucis that it takes absolutely no notice of recent (and original) work on the 
specifically ‘biological’ contribution to debates on substance, personal identity, species etc. in early modern 
thought, in which figures like Gassendi or Walter Charleton loom large (see notably Fisher, ed. [2003] and Smith, 
ed. [2006]).  
4 Helga Nowotny, as cited in Mendelsohn (1987), p. 93. 
5 For an early attempt to answer this sort of question see Roger (1980), esp. p. 258f. 
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as Domenico Bertoloni Meli does in an exemplary recent article, emphasizing the interplay 
between the mathematical and medical disciplines, so that “when unraveling the intellectual 
world in the seventeenth-century, we can no longer separate the history of anatomy from the 
history of science as if anatomists and physicians inhabited a different world from not only 
mechanical and experimental philosophers, but also mathematicians,”6 this still does not help 
us answer question (ii) above. We could extend the narrative of the Scientific Revolution to 
include debates on the circulation of blood, or the usefulness of the microscope (say, Borelli 
versus Locke), or the epistemological status of the ‘animal economy’ in relation to machine as 
well as soul7; we could be more faithful to the actual contents of the reports presented to the 
Royal Society or the Académie des Sciences in their first fifty years of existence, which turn out 
to be much more biologically oriented than the historiography had led us to believe8 – but 
these extensions would miss the dimension of ‘crisis’, that is, the sense that the existence of 
living beings suddenly again becomes an explanatory challenge or even a scandal (whether it is 
a scandal from the standpoint of physics9 or on the contrary from the standpoint of the 
autonomy of biology). 
In addition, our title question also implies a historiographic claim about the 
Enlightenment, which follows from (i): 
(iii) Life is a controversial topic for the eighteenth century, not the seventeenth (regardless 
of the varied and significant contributions of Sanctorius, Harvey, Glisson, 
Malpighi, Baglivi, Descartes, Guillaume Lamy, Swammerdam, Van Helmont …). 
                                                 
6 Bertoloni Meli (2008), p. 709. To my knowledge the first person to raise the issue was Salomon-Bayet (1978), 
pp. 12, 15, 112, 334 and in the Anglophone literature Cook (1990), pp. 401-404. To mention one more example: 
out of fifteen essays by prominent scholars in a recent volume on ‘Rethinking the Scientific Revolution’ (Osler, 
ed. [2000]), not a single one treats even secondarily of the life sciences. Kiernan (1968) argues for a split between 
physical sciences and life sciences throughout the eighteenth century in France, which is very strange, if we 
consider figures such as Maupertuis, who sought to extend Newtonian concepts into the realm of generation, or 
Buffon, who translated Stephen Hales and sought to produce a kind of ‘arithmetic’ of life. Even Diderot declared 
that his essays on probability were, together with the Rêve de D’Alembert, his favourite amongst his writings 
(Diderot [1961], p. 126). 
7 The first case is now too frequently discussed for citations to be necessary; on the latter two cases see Salter and 
Wolfe (2009) and Wolfe and Terada (2008). 
8 E.g. Hahn (1971)’s classic study of the Académie des Sciences completely omits the life sciences; Kaplan (1993) 
fails to consider that ‘embodied forms of knowledge’ really were an issue for the Royal Society. Conversely, in a 
recent attempt to produce a historical survey of the philosophy of biology (Grene and Depew [2004]), the authors 
bypass our era and thus our controversies entirely, by moving from Aristotle to Descartes and then to Buffon. 
That the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries might have expressed something of a ‘crisis’ on topics such as 
body, species and the minimal constituents of living matter (e.g. Gassendi, Charleton, Lamy) is not an issue for 
this work. 
9 Thus Jacques Monod described the discovery that motivated him to go into biology: “the scandal that certain 
objects exist with the properties of living beings and appearing to violate some physical principles or at least the 
general notion of the physical world. It seemed scandalous to me. I felt naïvely that one had to confront this 
scandal” (Monod [1970], p. 50). 
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This directly reverses Foucault’s claim in The Order of Things that ‘Life’ did not exist before the 
emergence of biology as a science bearing that name, in the nineteenth century,10 as well as the 
much more common claim, found typically in histories of physiology and related textbooks, 
that the ‘modern’, functionally specified concept of man as machine successfully banished 
concepts such as ‘Life’ from science, especially once the ‘machine’ is augmented with 
Darwinian evolution and the modern synthesis.11
The irony here is that it is precisely after Cartesian or LaMettrian concepts of bêtes-
machines or homes-machines that Life becomes a locus of a kind of ontological crisis, either 
because natural philosophers worry about what it is, what its minimal conditions and 
components are, or because they worry about the boundaries between dead matter and living 
matter – such as when Buffon, in his comparison of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, 
ponders the exact nature of “le vivant et l’animé”: whether Life is a metaphysical property of 
certain entities (“un degré métaphysique des êtres”) or a “physical property of matter”; he 
ultimately opts for a kind of ‘panspermist’ hypothesis in which life is always potentially present 
in matter, notably in the form of organic molecules, so that “raw matter” merely means “dead 
matter.”12 Similarly, Gabriel-François Venel, in his long entry “Chymie” for the Encyclopédie, 
states that organic molecules and organized bodies are subject to laws that are different from 
(“essentiellement diverses de”) the laws of matter in motion; as sources, he refers both to 
Buffon and to the errors of iatromechanist physicians with respect to the functioning of the 
“animal economy.”13
 Lastly, in addition to this revision of the ‘Enlightenment’ concept, our question also 
raises a specific disciplinary issue standing in close relation to point (ii) above: 
(iv) Does this emerging ontological concern about Life reflect the constitution of a science? 
Is it a precondition for a science? The concern and its various verbal expressions 
                                                 
10 Foucault (1966), including the additional claim that “l’histoire naturelle, à l’époque classique, ne peut pas se 
constituer comme biologie” (p. 173). For an excellent, less tendentious discussion of the shifting meanings of 
‘biology’ and its predecessors, ‘physiology’ and ‘natural history’, and an analysis of the relation between 
‘philosophy’ and these terms, see Gayon (1998). For the newer view that the eighteenth century was significantly 
concerned with ‘vital’ matters, see Reill (2005), which is full of in-depth analyses of figures such as Buffon, 
Barthez and then Herder and the Humboldts, but is confusing taken as a whole. 
11 The classic, and influential statement of this view is Loeb (1912); see also Smith (1976) for suggestive, but 
inconclusive discussion. 
12 Buffon (1749), II, Histoire générale des animaux, ch. 1, “Comparaison des animaux et des végétaux,” in Buffon 
(1954), pp. 238a-b; ibid., ch. 2, “De la reproduction en général,” in Buffon (1954), p. 245b.  
13 Venel (1753), p. 410. 
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clearly predate the coinage of the word ‘biology’ in German and French (and its 
establishment as a science) by roughly a century.14 
As I will try to show in closing, the emergence of a ‘field of controversy’ concerning the status 
of Life is hardly synonymous with the constitution of the science called ‘biology’. That does 
not mean it is not productive of forms of knowledge, such as ‘medicine’ or ‘natural history’ or 
in a very different kind of categorization, ‘knowledge of the body’. But by the time the name 
‘biology’ (or its close competitor, ‘zoonomy’) comes to the fore as a “synthetic, unitary science 
of life,”15 its concerns are quite different. Similarly, the question of the ‘scientificity’ of 
medicine and anatomy in the late seventeenth century, or their disputed ‘revolutionary’ status 
are again not to be confused with the existence of controversies over Life. 
 
1. Was Life a controversial topic in early modern natural philosophy?  
If we can speak of early modern life science, from physiology to theories of generation, 
from the chemical investigation of blood, aether and spirits to treatises on fermentation and 
fevers, then we can inquire into its relation to the constitution and stabilization of other parts 
of natural philosophy, such as mechanics and atomistic physics. Figures such as Harvey, 
Descartes and Borelli, or Boyle, Pitcairne and Malpighi, or Charleton and Boerhaave then loom 
large on the map and if our goal were to revise accounts of the Scientific Revolution so that 
they took account of such figures, it would seem reasonably easy to achieve – although if we 
hoped to find scientific discoveries which contribute to a unified notion of physiological 
function, we shall not; if we take, e.g., one century of analyses of digestion, from Francesco 
Redi and Giovanni Borelli in the 1650s-1660s to René de Réaumur and Théophile de Bordeu 
in the 1750s, none of the experiments on gizzards and their grinding power, discussed by many 
naturalists, produce any unified result, until Lazzaro Spallanzani conducts experiments on 
digestion in the 1780s.16
But, as I have suggested in the Introduction, another problem arises, which is less easy 
to resolve. It was stated bluntly in the early 1700s by Georg-Ernest Stahl, a court physician to 
Duke Johann Ernst of Saxon-Weimar and subsequently, as of 1694, a Professor of Medicine at 
the University of Halle: in all these competing theories of the human body, notably the very 
successful mechanistic theories, “Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no 
                                                 
14 See Salomon-Bayet (1981); Caron (1988). 
15 Singer (1929/1958), p. 917. 
16 Salomon-Bayet (1978), pp. 336f., 342-343, 355f., 348. 
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logical definition provided.”17 To follow Stahl’s suggestion, we could say that Life is either 
discussed but immediately dissipated into the entities and processes which subserve it, or 
promoted to the extent that vital spirits, vital heat, animation are so co-extensive to the field of 
investigation that Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. There is discussion, but no 
controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization between Life and non-Life (with the 
notable exception of Stahl in his polemic with Leibniz, which I shall turn to in section 2). Let 
us consider some representative examples. 
Boyle’s corpuscularianism, despite its experimental attention to living bodies, the 
‘history of human blood’, respiration and so forth, holds that living and nonliving things alike 
are arrangements of a single universal matter, which is corpuscular. Vital processes may be 
considered as separations and recombinations of material corpuscles. Boyle does not want to 
trace vitality back to a faculty or a power, but rather to a certain arrangement of particles. 
Blood does not possess an innate faculty which makes it ‘alive’ but, like sweat or snow, 
possesses its specific chemical properties “by virtue of the motion, size, figure and contrivance 
of [its]own parts,” and new qualities are produced by “changing the texture or motion” of 
bodies’ constituent corpuscles.”18 Now, in an interesting passage in his Disquisition About the 
Final Causes of Natural Things – a work in which Boyle describes the human body as a 
‘hydraulico-pneumatic’ machine – Boyle appears to grant that there is a kind of category 
difference between “Living Animals” and “Dead ones,” in which the latter are more like 
stones, possessed simply of a static structure. But then he quickly returns to his ‘micro-
mechanical’ view (even if, qua corpuscularian his mechanism is an enhanced mechanism 
possessed of chemical properties) and explains that the difference lies in the innumerable 
“Liquors, Spirits, Digestions, Secretions, Coagulations” but also “Motions” of the body and its 
limbs, which are present in living bodies but not in dead ones; in other words, a purely 
structural difference.19
If we turn to mechanism, including its medical variant, iatromechanism (leaving aside 
here the irreducible variety of forms of mechanism, the incommensurability of their types of 
explanation, including the possibility that iatromechanism may have been “simply irrelevant to 
                                                 
17 Stahl (1706b), in Stahl (1859), vol. 2, p. 224. 
18 Boyle, Origin of Forms and Qualities (1666), in Boyle (1772), vol. 3, p. 13; see also Some Considerations Touching the 
Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy, Second Tome (1671), in ibid., vol. 3, p. 427; Hall (1969), vol. 1, p. 294. 
19 Boyle (1688), pp. 74-75. 
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biology,” and the distinction between a mechanistic ontology and a mechanistic method20), we 
might expect to find a straightforward elimination of vital properties in favour of size, shape 
and motion, including the classic rejection of final causes which is a mark of the Scientific 
Revolution (thinking of Galileo’s description of the ‘fool’ in his Dialogues, Simplicio, as a cause-
finalier, who thinks that horses are on earth for the sake of man, grass is for horses, clouds and 
rain are there for the grass21, or Bacon’s exclusion from “Physick” of explanations such as “the 
firmness of the skins and hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities of 
heat and cold : or, . . . the leaves of trees are for protecting the fruit,”22 and of course his 
‘barren virgins’; Spinoza’s contempt for the human ignorance which projects concepts of 
purpose onto the natural world, and so on). Excluding final causes (and thus purposive vital 
faculties, but also humors and elements23) in favour of a mechanistic scientific program 
produced notable drawbacks, such as the difficulty in accounting for ‘epigenetic’ processes. 
Thus Descartes, who actively promoted the use of mechanical models as heuristics in studying 
the body, famously admitted his inability to account for the processes of generation in terms 
that were compatible with the mechanistic program he had set out for himself: “The formation 
of all the parts of the human body … is something so difficult that I dare not attempt (to 
explain it) yet”24; as Dennis Des Chene comments: “Among the phenomena of life, generation 
offers, along with the apparently reasoned behavior of higher animals, the greatest challenge to 
a science based on Cartesian principles.”25 This much is well known; the point I wish to 
emphasize is that everything ‘vital’ is necessarily excluded from the model, ironically given 
Descartes’ repeated insistence on health as an ultimate value and his ultimate, post-Cartesian 
doubt insistence on the survival value of our sensory organs. This exclusion is manifest in most 
of the celebrated pieces of iatromechanist propaganda, from Baglivi and Boerhaave: 
Since Physicians began to examine the Structure and Actions of a living Body, not by 
Physico-Mechanical and Chymical Experiments, but by Geometrico-Mechanical 
Principles, they have not only discovered an infinite number of things that were 
unknown to former Ages; but have made it out, that a Human Body, as to its natural 
Actions is truly nothing else but a complex of Chymico-Mechanical Motions, 
depending on such Principles as are purely Mathematical. For whoever takes an 
                                                 
20 For the former possibility see Westfall (1971), p. 104; for the latter distinction see Des Chene (2005), pp. 249-
250. 
21 Galileo (1623/1953), p. 71. 
22 Bacon (1605/2000), pp. 86-87. 
23 Anstey (forthcoming 2010). 
24 Descartes to Elisabeth, May 1646, AT IV, 407. 
25 Des Chene (2003), p. 413. Descartes’ ‘failure’ to explain generation was notorious in the eighteenth century, e.g. 
Réaumur in the Art d’éclore des poulets saying it is worse than if Descartes had failed to explain the universe (cited in 
Gasking [1967], p. 68). 
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attentive view of its Fabrick, he’ll really meet with Shears in the Jaw-bones and Teeth, 
… Hydraulick Tubes in the Veins, Arteries and other Vessels, a Piston in the Heart, a 
Sieve or Straining-Holes in the Viscera, a Pair of Bellows in the Lungs, … Pulleys in 
the Corners of the Eyes. And tho’ the Chymists explain the Phaenomena of natural 
Things, by the Terms of Fusion, Sublimation, Precipitation &c. And so make a 
separate sort of Philosophy; yet all these ought to be imputed to the Force of a Wedge, 
Balance, Leaver, Spring, and such like Mechanical Principles … the natural Effects of 
an animated Body can’t be accounted for with greater Facility and Clearness any other 
way… (Baglivi, De praxi medica, 1696) 
and 
The solid parts of the human body are either membranous Pipes, or Vessels including 
the Fluids, or else Instruments made up of these, and more solid Fibres, so formed and 
connected, that each of them is capable of performing a particular Action by the 
Structure, whenever they shall be put into Motion ; we find some of them resemble 
Pillars, Props, …, some like Axes, Wedges, Leavers and Pullies, others like Cords, 
Presses or Bellows ; and others again like Sieves, Straines, Pipes … ; and the Faculty of 
performing various Motions by these Instruments, is called their Functions, which are 
all performed by mechanical Laws, and by them only are intelligible (Boerhaave, 
Academical Lectures on the Theory of Physic, late 1730s).26
 
One can see why Stahl protested that Life had vanished from the bio-medical purview! Indeed, 
in a kind of unconscious echo of Stahl’s concerns, Boerhaave declared in a much-cited lecture 
on the “use of mechanical methods in medicine” that “the human body is in its nature the 
same as the whole of the Universe.”27
 Of course, these apparently ‘pure’ statements of iatromechanism mask a more complex 
(and concrete) reality on the ground, where functional dimensions are never wholly absent 
from physiological explanations (even Descartes will speak of the “office” of the liver28) and 
chemical explanations as used in medicine by figures such as Willis and Stahl blend, if not 
seamlessly, quantitative and qualitative definitions of fermentation, such that one no longer 
knows what is a strictly particulate explanation versus one on which invokes ‘liquors’, ‘juices’, 
‘heat’ and so forth. Consider for instance this elegant statement on the body from Bernard de 
Fontenelle in 1707, ostensibly in the context of a discussion of the pituitary gland: 
The human body considered in relation to an infinite number of voluntary movements 
it can perform, is a prodigious assemblage of Levers pulled by Ropes. If one considers 
it in relation to the motion of the liquors it contains, it is another [sort of] assemblage 
of an infinite number of Tubes and Hydraulic Machines. Finally, if one examines it in 
relation to the production of these liquors, it is an infinite assemblage of Chymical 
Instruments or Vessels, Filters, Distillation Vats, Receptacles, Serpentines, etc. . . . The 
greatest Chemistry apparatus of all in the human Body, the most wonderful 
                                                 
26 Baglivi (1696/1704), pp. 135-136; Boerhaave (1708/1751), p. 81. 
27 Boerhaave (1703/1983), p. 96. 
28 Descartes to Elisabeth, May 1646, AT IV, 407. 
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Laboratory is the in the Brain, from whence this Extract of the blood is drawn known 
as Spirits, the sole material motors of the entire Machine of the Body.29
 
 In addition, there is one notable exception to this narrative of the ‘absence of Life’: 
Francis Glisson’s Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica, seu de vita naturae ejusque tribus facultatibus 
perceptiva, appetitiva, motiva (1672), usually referred to as De vita naturae. After publishing various 
significant medical works, such as De rachitide in 1650 and De anatomia hepatis in 1654, Glisson 
produced this treatise on the ‘life of nature’, describing life as immanent to matter (“life is the 
intimate and inseparable essence of matter” and “matter contains within itself the root of 
life”30). Now, it would be easy to dismiss this as a kind of substance metaphysics, as indeed 
Albrecht von Haller did when he both credited Glisson with the discovery of the property of 
muscular irritability and excluded him from the history of science proper;31 but clearly Glisson 
reflects on the nature of our organic structure (organizatio, § 11), its relation to our sense organs, 
and how animal spirits are not a sufficient explanation of the features of ‘animation’ and 
complex perception which our sense organs display. However, it remains a challenge to 
integrate this aspect of Glisson into a Scientific Revolution narrative (it is rather a species of 
matter theory) and in addition, this very immanentism means that the nature of Life does not 
arise as a topic for controversy for Glisson. A converse attempt has been made recently by 
Guido Giglioni to present the existence of a ‘vitalistic’ strain no longer in a marginal but in a 
central figure, Bacon, focusing on the theme of the ‘appetites of matter’ and the related 
fixation on the “prolongation of life.”32 However, on the issue of the demarcation of ‘Life’ as 
an object (a) that requires a specific science or group of sciences and (b) which existing 
sciences do not adequately treat, it seems more relevant that when Bacon is outlining the 
contents of the Sylva sylvarum (published posthumously in 1626), he presents thirteen works as 
“physiological remains,”33 but out of these, seven concern minerals and six concern attractive 
force and the transformations of inanimate bodies (even if Bacon discusses these in biological 
terms); thus Bacon does not attend to, or is not concerned with, a distinction between the 
living and the non-living. 
Mechanism, corpuscularianism, Baconian natural philosophy (to which one could add 
Locke’s Helmontian medical reflections but also his philosophical consideration of the ‘life’ 
                                                 
29 Fontenelle (1707/1730), p. 16 (translation mine). 
30 Glisson (1672), § 8; I quote from a draft translation of De Vita Naturae by Guido Giglioni, which he was kind 
enough to share with me. 
31 See Giglioni (2008). 
32 Giglioni (2009), (2005). 
33 “Table of Contents,” in Bacon (1854). 
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that is the unity and identity of a plant, animal or a man34) do not address the question of Life; 
they do not see it as a problem, or a fortiori an ontological crisis. If it is historically insensitive to 
completely leave out the life sciences from all accounts of the Scientific Revolution, as so many 
do, it is also mistaken to completely gloss over the problem, either in strong terms, such as 
when Harvey is simply described as a bona fide member of the intellectual construct called 
‘Scientific Revolution’ (“Harvey … tended to stress the importance of observation and 
experiment, an increased emphasis on which was a vital part of that change in outlook which is 
sometimes called the Scientific Revolution”35), or in weaker terms, such as Peter Dear’s more 
recent statement that there is “no reason in principle” to “ignore the sciences of life,” since 
‘physics’ in the early modern period is conceived as inquiry into nature in general.36 Something 
is missing from this picture. Some scholars, particularly in the humanities, would say that what 
is missing is the body – and an entire sub-discipline of cultural history has devoted itself over the 
past twenty-plus years to studying the historical constitution of the body, with particular 
attention given to its Renaissance and early modern formations.37 But precisely, what 
differentiates a living body from a corpse – a leitmotiv in the concern with Life – is heavily 
determined by the involvement with chemistry. It is to this, via Leibniz, that I now turn. 
 
2. Machines of nature, ferments and chemical metaphysics 
Mechanistic approaches to Life should not be caricatured as they sometimes are, e.g. by 
Richard Westfall, who described medical mechanism as “the puppet regime set up by the 
mechanical philosophy’s invasion.”38 Whether in its earliest phases or – most evidently – in its 
late and complexified form such as Albrecht von Haller’s ‘micro-mechanical’ analysis of 
physiological structure, combining structural and functional explanations, these approaches are 
not blind to the nature of vital processes, but seek to heuristically model them, e.g. by the 
                                                 
34 See Locke (1701/1975), II.xxvii.4-6 on the Life qua identity of plants, animals and humans in mereological 
terms. His last word on the question (ibid., III.x.22) does not advance the issue very much: the term ‘life’ is obvious 
for everyone, but when one turns to the status of a plant in a seed, a chicken in an egg, or a dying man, its sense is 
harder to grasp.  
35 Gasking (1967), p. 40. Rather more à propos is that, whatever Harvey’s epistemological approach towards 
circulation was (mechanistic? Aristotelean? Empiricist? Paduan? Hypothetico-deductive?), “he did not attempt to 
formulate any general laws of life on a purely mechanical basis” (Ackerknecht [1982], p. 114). 
36 Dear (1998), p. 190. 
37 Above all, see Brown (1988), Turner (1984) and Sawday (1995), on ancient, modern and Renaissance régimes 
of the body; and now the section on ‘Bodies’ in Cooter & Pickstone, eds. (2000) and Mandressi (2009). 
38 Westfall (1971), p. 104. 
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usage of automata, which Borelli cleverly described as having “a certain shadowy sameness 
(umbratilem similitudinem) to animals.”39
 And yet something has changed by the time of Buffon and Diderot in the late 1740s. 
‘Life’, ‘organized bodies’ and gradually ‘organisms’ are everywhere. Where the Encyclopédie 
devotes a long entry to “Life” (“Vie”), its predecessor and inspiration of fifty years earlier, 
Chambers’ Cyclopedia, has none. Conversely, the Encyclopédie has no article on Galileo (whereas 
Galileo features prominently, e.g. in Brucker’s Historia critica philosophiae, which is a major 
source of the Encyclopédie40). In 1753, Diderot gave an exhortatory dimension to this state of 
affairs, and declared that 
We are on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences. Given the taste people seem 
to have for morals, belles-lettres, the history of nature and experimental physics, I dare 
say that before a hundred years, there will not be more than three great geometricians 
remaining in Europe. The science will stop short where the Bernoullis, the Eulers, the 
Maupertuis, the Clairaut, the Fontaines and the D’Alemberts will have left it. . . . We 
will not go beyond.41
 
Similarly, Buffon asserted that “mathematical truths are merely mental abstractions, which lack 
anything real.”42  Diderot also gave an explicitly ‘vital’ or ‘biologistic’ inflexion to metaphysics, 
declaring that “It is very hard to think cogently about metaphysics or ethics without being an 
anatomist, a naturalist, a physiologist, and a physician.”43 What were the roots of this ‘vital’ 
change? Conceptually, Leibnizianism plays a key role – not necessarily the substance 
metaphysics of Leibniz as he intended it, but the series of deliberate, materialistically and/or 
biologistically inclined misreadings that were produced notably in France during the early 
Enlightenment.44 In a sense it is ironic for this turn towards ‘Life’ to involve Leibniz so 
strongly, since he notably described organisms as ‘machines of nature’ which are machines 
down to their smallest parts and rejected extra-causal, mysterious vital forces. What did he 
mean by this? 
Leibniz, like Aristotle, drew heavily on his observations (and reports from 
microscopists such as Leeuwenhoeck) concerning living beings in the formulation of his 
                                                 
39 Borelli (1680), II, viii. 
40 As noted by Salomon-Bayet (1978), p. 384. 
41 Diderot, Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature, § 4, in Diderot (1994), p. 561. 
42 “De la manière d’étudier l’Histoire Naturelle,” in Buffon (1749), p. 53. 
43 Wellman (1987), p. 89, n. 43; “il est bien difficile de faire de la bonne métaphysique et de la bonne morale, sans 
être anatomiste, naturaliste, physiologiste et médecin” (Réfutation suivie de l’ouvrage d’Helvétius intitulé L’Homme 
[1773-1775], in Diderot [1994], p. 813). 
44 Canguilhem (1980), Wolfe (forthcoming 2010). 
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metaphysics of substance. It is not that monads possess uniquely vital properties, but that their 
definition is inspired by the self-maintaining, self-regulating, autonomous features of living 
beings. In addition, Leibniz seems to have coined the term ‘organism’ in a technical sense to 
mean a type of entity different from machines, synonymous with ‘organized body’. (I say 
‘technical sense’ because the term is used even after Leibniz, e.g. in the Encyclopédie – where it 
does occur, contrary to the claims of earlier scholars – in a yet undefined sense of the word, as 
synonymous with ‘mechanism’.45) But mostly, Leibniz speaks of living beings as “machines of 
nature,” in various writings. The key feature of machines of nature is that they are machines 
down to their smallest parts, to infinity: “The organism of a living being (organismus viventium) is 
nothing other than a divine mechanism which is more subtle than an ordinary mechanism in 
the infinity of its subtlety.”46 These aspects of Leibniz’s thought occur, as very often with him, 
in dialogue or confrontation with other thinkers – here, notably Ralph Cudworth’s ‘plastick 
natures’ and Georg-Ernest Stahl’s anima. Due to the law of the conservation of force among 
other reasons, Leibniz refuses to allow for any type of extra-causal influence on bodies of a 
vital principle that would be separate from bodies as a whole. Hence he denies a concept of 
‘soul’ as the motive force or controller in the body, which is what Stahl put forth. Leibniz 
insists that everything that happens in Nature happens according to mechanical laws. Of 
course, Leibniz also holds that Life stems from a “deeper source” than the ontological level of 
mechanically specifiable Nature, which remains at the level of passivity.47
This aspect of Leibniz – that there is something unique about living beings, and this 
uniqueness is metaphysically grounded – was strongly brought to the fore by a series of his 
disciples precisely concerned with ‘biophilosophy’ and, increasingly, with the difference 
between organic and inorganic entities: Louis Bourguet in the 1720s and, better-known, 
Charles Bonnet a generation later. Bourguet, in the course of an extensive analysis of crystals, 
developed an original notion of “organic mechanisms” (méchanismes organiques) which 
functioned in a different way than ordinary mechanisms, and directly influenced Buffon’s idea 
of “organic molecules.” He suggested that there was a difference between the growth of 
crystals by juxtaposition or the apposition of new parts, and the organic process of 
intussusception by which new molecules are integrated into the organic body and form a part 
                                                 
45 In the Encyclopédie articles “Fibre” and “Nutrition” (VI, p. 670; XI, p. 288) the terms “méchanisme” and 
organisme” are used interchangeably, e.g. “the mechanism or organism of nutrition.” 
46 Leibniz (1961), p. 16, § 13; Leibniz (1978), I, p. 15. 
47 Leibniz to Hoffmann, 27 September 1699, in Hoffmann (1749), pp. 49a-b, discussed in Duchesneau (1982), p. 
82; Leibniz’s reply to Stahl in Stahl (1720/1864), p. 14. 
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of it – a distinction repeated almost exactly in the second half of the eighteenth century by 
Linnaeus, Lamarck and others.48 Bourguet describes “organic mechanisms” in Leibnizian 
terms as a combination of various types of molecules – from aether, water, earth, the air, etc. – 
which are subordinate to a “dominant Monad or Activity.”49 As for Bonnet, he explicitly 
declares that “nutrition, development and the formation of a new organized being are the 
products of an unknown force . . . which has nothing in common with mechanical forces,”50 and 
more humorously, that “I have always led my reader back to the Being of beings, and shown 
his handiwork in all the products which had falsely been traced back to purely mechanical 
causes, as if an animal had the same origin as a cheese” (Bonnet was Swiss, after all).51
But let us return to the discussion with Stahl, since it is essentially here that Leibniz 
develops a concept of organism, because Stahl, in a combination of medico-physiological and 
chemical reflection, insists repeatedly on Life. To put it differently, the recognition of ‘Life’ as a 
problem (which goes hand in hand with the formulation of ‘organism’ as a concept) is an effect 
of Leibniz’s debate with Stahl. And, especially on Stahl’s part, the conceptualization of what an 
organism is and how it differs from a mechanism (or, which is much the same, how a living 
body differs from a dead body) centrally involves chemistry (or ‘chymistry’); hence Life 
becomes an object of controversy. I shall briefly discuss this chemical contribution to the 
emergence of ‘Life’ as an ontologically problematic entity (notably with the concept of 
fermentation, and the consequent role of analyses of digestion) before turning, in section 3, to 
the radical materialist appropriation of these inseparably chemical and ‘biophilosophical’ 
elements, and its relation to the constitution of ‘biology’. 
If we recall Bourguet’s distinction between the formation of crystals by juxtaposition of 
their components, versus organic entities which are formed by the intussusception of their 
molecules, the issue with chemistry – particularly the notions of fermentation and ‘seeds’ (what 
Gassendi called, using a Lucretian term, semina rerum52) – we can see that the issue is a 
distinction between beings that are merely ‘formed’ and beings that are ‘generated’. It is only in 
                                                 
48 Bourguet (1729), 4th letter, pp. 73, 165-166; see Cheung (2006), § 2; also Duchesneau (2003); Linnaeus, 
Introduction to the Systema naturae (and of course in his celebrated aphorism that ‘Stones grow, plants grow, and 
live, animals grow, live and feel’, in the Philosophia botanica); Lamarck in the Système des Animaux sans vertèbres, 
discussing the formation of the shell in mollusks (Lamarck [1801], p. 55). 
49 Bourguet, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 
50 Bonnet (1764), p. 92 (emphasis mine). 
51 Letter to Malesherbes of October 30 1762, quoted in Savioz (1948), p. 214; Bonnet is admittedly protesting 
against the ban of his Considérations.  
52 The difference is that for Lucretius these ‘seeds’ were simply atoms, whereas for Gassendi they were 
composites or compounds of atoms; see Bloch (1971), p. 252, n.75. 
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the late seventeenth century that this distinction becomes crucial – both because the list of 
candidates for the latter gradually gets defined more narrowly, so it can no longer includes 
metals, crystals and minerals, and because the ‘chemiatric’ Paracelsian-Helmontian-Sylvian-
Stahlian tradtion of alchemy-chymistry-chemistry strongly focuses on the processes that are 
unique to organic beings, such as fermentation.53
A major source for this idea of fermentation is Thomas Willis (1622-1675), who taught 
natural philosophy at Oxford and medicine in London; he was best known perhaps for his 
discovery of the ‘circle of Willis’ and his great work on the anatomy of the brain (De cerebri 
anatome, 1664, richly illustrated by Christopher Wren). But the work that concerns us is his De 
fermentatione (1659), translated as A Medical-Philosophical Discourse of Fermentation; or, Of the Intestine 
Motion of Particles in Every Body. De fermentatione was meant to be the introduction to his theory of 
fevers, which in fact he explained as the outcome of a vitiated fermentation of blood (Willis 
also says that he added a treatise on fever to the one on fermentation in order to apply his 
fermentation theory to fever). “Every disease acts its Tragedies by the strength of some 
Ferment.”54 Is fermentation chemical or mechanical? The chemiatric answer should be 
straightforwardly the former, since it describes all bodies as being composed of the principles 
of Spirit, Sulphur, Salt, Water and Earth and the mixture and proportion of these.55 But Willis 
complicates matters by sometimes speaking of fermentation in more purely chemiatric terms, 
sometimes in more mechanical terms, as a motion of the parts. Ferments helped kindle the 
particles of spirit and sulphur in the blood into a flame, a combustion that was also called 
effervescence of the blood, which is how Willis explains body heat and fever. The 
fermentation in the heart heats the blood like “Water Boyling over a Fire,”56 and this heat is 
distributed to the whole body through blood circulation, constituting the common cause of 
ordinary body warmth as well as febrile heat. Our body heat is the effect of a chemical cause—
                                                 
53 I thank Justin E.H. Smith for this suggestion. Joly (2008) observes that Renaissance and early modern chymical 
treatises frequently describe minerals and metals in terms which we would only use for living beings (“seeds and 
germination, growth and rot, death and resurrection”); he suggests that this is less because the chemists were 
intellectually chaotic and more because a doctrine of living being was simply absent. 
54 Willis, cited in Debus (2001), p. 69. 
55 According to Clericuzio (ms., 2009), spirits, sulphur and salts are the active principles (with spirits being the 
most active), while earth and water are passive. Spirits affect various properties of the body, from heat to 
conservation to preventing putrefaction; e.g., the digestive system is described as a process of fermentation in the 
stomach. For a discussion of chemical vs. mechanical explanations of fermentation, see Mendelsohn (1964), p. 
380; Chang (2002), pp. 56, 59f. 
56 Willis, Of Feavers, in Willis (1659/1681), ch. I, § 1, p. 59 (pagination continous with Of Fermentation); Chang 
(2004), p. 785. 
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specifically, of fermentation.57 And, most relevantly for us, “The first beginnings of life 
proceed from the spirit fermenting in the heart.”58
Stahl, too, viewed the body as composed of organic matter in a process of 
fermentation, which in fact meant it was vulnerable to putrefaction – indeed, always in a 
process of putrefaction in some sense. Some parts of the body are more vulnerable than 
others, notably the blood; hence Stahl describes circulation as a process which preserves the 
mixtio of the blood and thereby maintains the stability of the whole. This is a good example of 
how his system renders the chemical and the metaphysical almost indissociable, in his 
description of the living body as a kind of dynamic equilibrium which constantly has to be 
maintained. On the one hand this equilibrium is chemically specified, both at the level of the 
concept of fermentation and with the description of the body as a chemical mixtio, not a mere 
aggregate – aggregates are merely mechanical combinations of portions of matter in motion, 
whereas mixts imply a notion of qualitative diversity above and beyond the spatial proximity 
between particles.59 Leibniz reiterated this in his own terms: “a mass of matter is not properly 
what I call a corporeal substance, but rather an aggregate of an infinity of such substances, like 
a pack of sheep or a pile of worms.”60 On the other hand, Stahl famously describes the body 
and its organs as literally mere instruments of the soul, a position sometimes revised so that 
“organs are not, as the name might suggest, mere instruments,” but nevertheless, “it is the soul 
that makes the lungs breathe, the heart beat, the blood circulate, the stomach digest, the liver 
secrete.”61 Put these two together and you have the notion of a “highly fermentable organic 
body [which] has to rely on a vigilant anima to discharge the corrupt and harmful materials 
from the vital economy in a timely manner.”62
These concepts of fermentation are closely linked to concepts of Life, and indeed were 
actively taken up in the second half of the eighteenth century by vitalists, notably when dealing 
with the phenomenon of digestion. Whereas mechanists or ‘solidists’, but also Newtonian-
inspired physicians (including Boerhaave and Pitcairne) would reduce digestion to a 
                                                 
57 Bates (1981) suggests that “for Fernel [and all traditional Galenists], the essence of fever was preternatural heat 
whereas for Willis it was an inordinate motion of the blood” (p. 49). 
58 Willis (1659/1681), ch. V, p. 13. 
59 This distinction, which is crucial for Stahl, will be wholly appropriated by Diderot who uses it to define the 
relation between matter in general, living, sensing individual molecules and the ‘sensitivity of the whole’. 
60 Leibniz, “Éclaircissement sur les Natures Plastiques et les Principes de Vie et de Mouvement” (1704), in 
Leibniz (1978), vol. 6, p. 550. 
61 Stahl (1706a), § xcviii, in Stahl (1859), p. 347. 
62 Chang (2002), p. 63. It’s not always so clear-cut, though, because chemistry for Stahl is both something foreign 
to the theoria medica vera and nevertheless that which explains life (Roger [1979], p. 45). 
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quantitative process of ‘trituration’, of spatial relations between masses, or more specifically the 
expansion and contraction of muscles, chemiatric physicians and post-Stahlian chemists like 
Gabriel-François Venel, in his articles for the Encyclopédie including “Chymie,” “Chaleur,” 
“Digestion” and “Mixte,” emphasize the chemical transformations of the substances involved 
in the digestive process. Thus François Boissier de Sauvages, in his Nosologie méthodique 
(originally published 1763), explains that the faculties of the body are equivalent to the 
properties of matter in general (e.g. gravity, elasticity and attraction), but that within the organism 
these produce processes of fermentation and putrefaction which seem to be restricted to living 
beings.63
Of course, the mechanical explanations of digestion are augmented with processes 
such as heat, vibration, the action of the spirits, and continuous compression, recalling our 
earlier point that it is not always appropriate to fully distinguish the ‘mechanical’ and the 
‘purposive’ or the ‘functional’, in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century physiology and natural 
philosophy.  Sauvages believed that the fully self-contained nature of his calculations on the 
body’s energy proved the existence of an independent soul which was the source of this 
motion, and – surprisingly, we would think, for an ‘animist’ – praised the discoveries of Baglivi, 
Pitcairne, Newton and Boerhaave precisely for their calculations as applied to the body.64 As 
Roger French comments, “it is something of an ‘ism’ paradox that the eighteenth-century 
‘mechanists’ generally described the body in non-quantitative terms whereas the ‘animists’ used 
mathematics to demonstrate the need of a soul to power the machine of the body.”65 A 
missing term in this opposition between mechanism and animism is vitalism. 
 Organisms, ferments and digestive systems all have some more or less obvious, more 
or less intuitive relation to an idea we might call ‘Life’, and indeed gradually, from the 
iatrochemists to Stahl, and onwards to his disciples in the mid-eighteenth century and their 
Auseinandersetzungen with the group of physicians who come to be called vitalists by the dawn of 
the next century,66 these kinds of phenomena, together with more broad ‘research 
programmes’ such as physiology (as opposed to anatomy), are being presented as specifically 
‘vital’. Venel, in the article “Chimie” in the Encyclopédie, speaks of “changes” which bodies 
                                                 
63 Sauvages (1763/1771), I, §§ 150-154, 261, 266. 
64 Sauvages (1731), p. 2. 
65 French (1990), p. 103. 
66 The word ‘vitalist’ appears at much the same time as does the word ‘biology’, a fact that has not so far been 
discussed much, if it all. On the history of the former, see Wolfe and Terada (2008); on the latter, see Caron 
(1988) and Barsanti (2000). 
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undergo, such that they “move from the non-organic state to the organic state,” and suggests 
that the “phenomena of organisation [i.e. organism, organic phenomena, CW] should be treated by a 
science separate from all other parts of Physic.”67 Where is the crisis, then? What happened to 
the ontological controversy? Remember that Stahl had spoken in fairly strong terms, if not of 
scandal then at least of shock: “What shocked me above all was that in this physical theory of 
the human body, Life was never mentioned nor defined, and I could find no logical definition 
provided.”68 And throughout the collection of essays entitled Theoria medica vera, he asks about 
‘what we call Life’, ‘what purpose does it serve’, within and outside the body? 
The problem from an external standpoint is not so much to find a definition – at the 
present time we still have not agreed on a definition of Life, or what constitutes its exact 
‘origin’69 – as to understand why it becomes a problem and what the effects of this problem 
are. One response, a fairly rhetorical one, is Théophile de Bordeu’s (Bordeu was a celebrated 
Montpellier vitalist, friend of Diderot – who turned him into a character in D’Alembert’s Dream 
– and collaborator of the Encyclopédie): “Spare us, once and for all, all these tiny fibres, 
pressures, globules, thick substances, sharp angles, lymph, hammers and all the rest of the 
equipment from mechanical workshops with which [earlier doctors] filled the living body – 
they were the playthings of our fathers.”70 Less rhetorically, another possible answer to the 
‘why?’ question is suggested by Peter Hans Reill: “if mechanism could, e.g., explain the 
pumping action of the heart, it was incapable of saying why the heart continually kept pumping 
without running down.”71 Obviously, for Stahl a major part of the answer lay in the soul, and 
specifically its purposive, goal-directed action – a view which earned him the ridicule of many 
prominent scientists, such as Haller, who suggested that Stahlians (who rejected interventionist 
medicine in the face of disease) were to mechanist physicians like a half-naked ancient German 
warrior was, compared with an armed Roman centurion, in uniform.72 One can also try and 
reconstruct Stahl’s often unnecessarily obscure argumentation in a charitable way, and point 
out that he never denies the basic laws of physics and chemistry, nor the fact that living bodies, 
too, obey the laws of motion. As we saw with fermentation, the idea is rather to articulate a 
                                                 
67 Venel (1753), p. 410. 
68 Stahl (1706), in Stahl (1859), vol. 2, p. 224. 
69 Deamer and Fleishaker (1994) is a useful collection on the issue. 
70 Bordeu (1764) in Bordeu (1818), II, p. 670. 
71 Reill (2005), p. 135. 
72 Haller (1751), p. 956 (a review of Volters’ Gedancken von Psychologischen sachen), as quoted in Reill (2005), pp. 123-
124. 
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kind of ‘emergentist’ view in the weak sense that certain arrangements of particles exhibit 
complex, goal-directed behavior. 
However, Stahl is quite adamant that the above be attributed to the soul – which then 
controls the various mechanically specifiable parts of the body as so many instruments. Stahl is a 
teleologist, who definitely believes that “The question, ‘What is life?’ lay behind everything I 
learned. Life seemed to be characterized by a peculiar reasonableness and purposefulness of 
instinctive involuntary action” – even if these words belong to another German, in the mid-
twentieth century: Wilhelm Reich.73 But all of the new chemical concepts he both appropriates 
and innovates with allow of both an anti-reductionist interpretation (his own), and a reductionist 
interpretation – which is not specifically mechanistic, as we shall see – with materialists such as 
Buffon and Diderot. And in this reductionist approach, the vital dimension is not discarded. 
 
3. Constitutive materialist ontology of Life or gradual constitution of biology? 
Neither biology nor chemistry exist as stable theoretical entities in the early modern or 
Enlightenment periods, even if chemistry had existed for a long time, but on  unstable 
methodological and conceptual bases, that are only unified with Lavoisier. Yet the constitution 
of an autonomous ontological region corresponding to ‘the science of living beings’, i.e. 
biology, is significantly affected by chemistry, as we have seen. One way to describe this is to 
say that chemistry is, at least at this time, the science which “allows for an understanding of 
matter as something that – at least provisionally – cannot be reduced to calculation.”74 Recall 
Buffon and Diderot’s anti-mathematical proclamations of a new science of Life (“natural 
history,” but also the study of the “animal economy” in medicine), or the prominence of the 
article “Vie” in the Encyclopédie. 
Chemiatric, Stahlian concepts that merge the chemical and the metaphysical are turned 
into reductive materialist concepts by Diderot (reductive notably in the sense that they are 
meant to replace explanations that appeal, e.g. to the soul), yet these concepts are not 
themselves meant to be mechanically or ultimately, mathematically specifiable. This takes 
several interrelated forms: his ‘enriched atomism’ of vital minima, in which the ‘atoms’ or 
‘molecules’ of living matter are themselves alive; his transformation of Hallerian irritability via 
                                                 
73 Reich (1968), p. 45. 
74 Starobinski (1999), p. 86. 
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Bordeu’s concept of sensitivity (sensibilité) into a concept of organic sensitivity which is itself a 
property of living matter. The difference between irritability and sensitivity in Haller is that the 
former is fully mechanically specifiable and is strictly a property of muscle fibres, while the 
latter has a functional component as it is directed towards the organism’s survival, and it 
presupposes the existence of the ‘soul’. 
In Diderot, this difference is collapsed into one property of living matter, with some 
waverings as to whether this property occurs in the elements or only in organized wholes, but 
he seems to opt ultimately for the latter. Sensitivity and therefore Life require, according to 
Diderot, the presence of organic “continuity” rather than mere spatial “contiguity” (a 
distinction directly recalling that between aggregate and mixt, in Stahl).75 The difference 
between the life of an organic being and the life of a wooden automaton, or a watch, is not 
that the former possesses a soul, or is free, whereas the latter is not. The difference is, one 
might say, a structural one, between two different types of arrangements of parts. This is what 
Leibniz, a favorite author of Diderot’s, meant when he declared that “a feeling or sensing being 
is not something mechanical like a watch or a windmill”76 – or, in Diderot’s version (which 
reflects his annoyance with the prevalent clock metaphor): “What a difference there is, 
between a sensing, living watch and a golden, iron, silver or copper watch!”77 This is why the 
concept of ‘mechanistic materialism’ is so problematic, and perhaps downright false78: because 
most materialists, unlike Descartes, do not claim that physical nature is essentially specifiable in 
mechanistic terms. Diderot’s challenge is to be able to do justice to the difference between 
organic and inorganic beings, without having reference to a concept of ‘soul’, anima, as the 
basis of animation (given that the distinction between ‘animate’ and ‘inanimate’ initially means 
possessed-of-soul, and not-possessed-of soul79). This will be the concept of active, sensing 
matter. Hence his materialism is significantly focused on the concept of Life. It is in this sense 
that his “revolutionary” fervor (of “We are at the dawn of a revolution”) is not just a way of 
participating in the emergence of biology as a science, since it is also a philosophical project – 
consider the article “Spinozists” of the Encyclopédie, by Diderot:  
SPINOSIST: follower of the philosophy of Spinosa. One must not confuse the ancient 
Spinosists with the modern Spinosists. The general principle of the latter is that matter 
is sensitive; they demonstrate this by the development of the egg, an inert body which 
                                                 
75 Diderot (1994), pp. 625-628. 
76 Leibniz, Preface to the New Essays, in Leibniz (1978), vol. 5, p. 59. 
77 Elements of Physiology, in Diderot (1994), p. 1283.  
78 Kaitaro (1987). 
79 Cunningham (2003), p. 58. 
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by the sole means [instrument] of graduated heat moves to the state of a sensing, living 
being, and by the growth of any animal which in its inception [principe] is merely a 
point, and through the nutritive assimilation of plants and – in one word – of all 
substances that serve the purpose of nutrition, becomes a great sensing and living 
body in a greater [expanse of] space. From this they conclude that only matter exists, 
and that it is sufficient to explain everything. For the rest, they follow ancient 
Spinosism in all of its consequences.80
 
No one has ever produced a satisfactory explanation as to why Diderot chooses to place an 
affirmation of his biologically motivated metaphysics within an entry on a philosopher (or a 
derivative of the philosopher, as the article “Spinoza” is a piece of theological boilerplate 
intended to reassure censorious readers who would logically turn to see what the Encyclopédie 
had to say about this scandalous figure) who did not himself think there was anything 
metaphysically unique about living beings. In the present context I will content myself with the 
observation that the difference between ‘ancient Spinosists’ and ‘modern Spinosists’ effectively 
maps onto the historical narrative I have been suggesting: whereas ancient Spinosists are 
essentially substance metaphysicians, their modern variants are essentially focused on Life, 
specifically, the radical implications of the biological theory of epigenesis. 
Epigenesis is of course a theory of generation which was opposed to the 
preformationist theory. We might think that we have finally encountered a proper controversy 
over Life (or at least generation); but in fact it is not one until Diderot takes hold of it. Or 
rather, to introduce a distinction, if ‘preformationism versus epigenesis’ is a controversy in the 
life sciences, beginning fitfully in the early 1700s in the Académie des Sciences and reaching 
full velocity with Haller, Wolff, and Blumenbach in the late years of the century, what happens 
with Diderot is that it becomes, precisely in the wake or rather the vein of Stahl, an ontological 
controversy. This is most explicit if we add to the entry ‘Spinosistes’ a passage from 
D’Alembert’s Dream, the first sentence of which François Jacob in fact used as an epigraph for 
his La logique du vivant: 
Do you see this egg? With this you can overthrow all the schools of theology, all the 
churches of the world. What is this egg? An unsensing mass, prior to the introduction 
of the seed [germe]; and after the seed has been introduced, what is it then? Still an 
unsensing mass, for the seed itself is merely an inert, crude fluid. How will this mass 
develop into a different [level of] organisation, to sensitivity and life? By means of 
heat. And what will produce the heat? Motion.81
 
                                                 
80 Diderot, s.v. “Spinosistes,” Encyclopédie vol. XV, p. 474 / Diderot (1994), p. 484. 
81 Diderot (1994), p. 618. 
 20
Aside from its stated radical dimension (overthrowing all schools of theology), there is also 
clearly something ‘vital’ about the commitment to epigenesis, or even ‘vitalistic’, as Hans 
Driesch observed: “All believers in epigenesis are Vitalists.”82
The transformative, ‘epigenetic’ dimension of living beings, which fascinates Diderot 
(“Voyez-vous cet œuf ?”) or La Mettrie (who uses Lucretian motifs to describe the living Earth 
as like a womb (‘utérus’) which has now grown barren, so that new species do not arise83), 
which also fuels the fascination with monsters, is very far removed from the set of possible 
criteria for the science of ‘biology’ by the early nineteenth century, which include a reductive 
constraint on explanations of living beings in terms of their physico-chemical nature, a 
unification criterion which states that all living entities (including plants and animals) possess 
properties such as development, reproduction, nutrition, respiration, beginning in a basic 
substance (protoplasm) and ultimately arriving, by the mid-nineteenth century, at the study of 
development, focusing on structure and function (morphology and anatomy versus 
physiology); at this point biology also requires cell theory in order to explain cellular division 
and conjugation, and has to incorporate evolutionary and ecological components.84 It is no 
surprise that Cuvier by 1810 can declare that “the anatomical portion of the general problem 
of life has been resolved for a long time, at least as concerns the animals which interest us the 
most.”85
 To reiterate the point otherwise, the various instances of an emerging ‘life science’ in 
the eighteenth century (from the renewal of theories of generation to Haller’s work on 
irritability, to pieces of ‘folk biology’ such as Trembley’s polyp or Bonnet’s aphids) are not 
themselves identical with an ontological concern with the status of Life. To conflate these two 
would be to create a monolithic concept of vitalism which would somehow lead inexorably to 
the constitution of biology as a science. As much as Buffon, Haller, Barthez, Blumenbach, 
Bordeu, Venel, Diderot and especially Ménuret de Chambaud insist on the separation between 
life sciences and physical sciences – a separation which formally culminates in Bichat, Cabanis, 
and Bernard – it is not clear that all these figures, and certainly not Bichat or the ‘founders’ (or 
at least coiners) of biology Lamarck, Treviranus and Carl Christian Erhard Schmid (the author 
                                                 
82 Driesch (1914), cited in Oyama (ms., 2009) 
83 La Mettrie (1750/1987), sections 8-11; he thinks the moderns can improve experimentally on this view, but 
does not reject it wholeheartedly. 
84 Singer (1929/1958), Caron (1988), Barsanti (2000). 
85 Cuvier (1810), II, “Histoire naturelle,” p. 207. 
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of Physiologie philosophisch bearbeitet, 1798-1801)86 care about ontology. After all, no less a figure 
than the head of the Montpellier vitalists, Paul-Joseph Barthez, declared “I am as indifferent as 
could be regarding Ontology considered as the science of entities.”87 It is true that some of these 
figures viewed these episodes of the coming-to-be of biology as not conforming to the laws of 
mechanics (or even violating them), and thus placing “in serious difficulty the traditional 
paradigm, based on the sovereignty of physics.”88 Thus the geologist Jean-Claude 
Delamétherie (not to be confused with Julien Offray de La Mettrie) declared that the living 
being was ‘a machine that confounds all our ideas of mechanics’.89
 
4. Conclusion 
 Why was there no controversy over Life in the Scientific Revolution? This episode (or 
absence of an episode) completely challenges concepts such as that of ‘paradigms’ or ‘normal 
science’, for at least two reasons. (a) Since the sciences involved in the constitution of Life as a 
problem are not unified, discursively, experimentally or by their objects, whether we speak of 
alchemy, natural history, chemiatric medicine or ‘metaphysical’ reflections on vital minima and 
the relation of body and soul; as Claire Salomon-Bayet pleasantly suggests, it would then have 
to be a “permanent revolution,”90 lasting one hundred and fifty years (in her case the object is 
the study of life in the Académie des Sciences; we could just as well say ‘from Harvey to 
Pasteur’91). (b) By the time it (biology, medicine, etc.) is a science and is perhaps on the way to 
producing normal vs. abnormal patterns of discourse (say, Pasteur versus Pouchet on 
spontaneous generation) then it has lost its ontological dimension and thus its sense of being a 
‘crisis’ or a ‘scandal’ – even if figures such as Hans Driesch at the end of the nineteenth 
century can effectively replay Stahl versus mechanism, invoking Aristotelian entelechies just 
like Stahl did. 
                                                 
86 Schmid (1798-1801), I, 140, cit. in Risse (1972), pp.153-154. See Schiller (1980), pp. 85-87; Caron (1988), pp. 
231-232 for further indications on the early uses of ‘biology’, ‘zoonomy’ and the older ‘physiology’ to designate 
the same science. 
87 Barthez (1806), vol. 1, p. 96, n. 17. 
88 Barsanti (2000), p. 124. 
89 Delamétherie (1787), II, p. 292, cited by Barsanti (2000), p. 124. 
90 Salomon-Bayet (1978), p. 15 and (1981), pp. 36, 39. 
91 Cuvier provides his own capsule history of the birth of life science qua science (i.e. as a system allowing for 
causal explanations): we have known the causal processes at work in digestion for centuries; the absorption of 
substances, since Pecquet, Rudbeck et Ruysch; the process of circulation, since Harvey. “The work of the English 
and Italian anatomists on the lymphatic system has . . . completed everything that remained to be said in this 
regard” (Cuvier, op. cit., p. 208). 
 22
If Life and the investigation into Life is not then manageable as a Scientific Revolution 
narrative, we can of course revise the latter to include more discussion of animal spirits, of 
Newton’s queries on sensation and their influence on biomedicine in the next generation, and 
of course of the shift from a notion of ‘soul’ to various embodied, cognitive and even 
neuropsychological concepts. We can also insist on the presence of quantitative 
experimentation, notably in the Italian anatomists. But we will not able to reconstruct a 
controversy over Life within the frame of the development of biology. In the seventeenth 
century Life is either everywhere, as in Gassendi or Glisson, but it is immediately dissipated 
into the entities and processes which mechanistically subserve it, or promoted to the extent 
that vital spirits, vital heat, ferments, seeds and other forms of animation are so co-extensive to 
the field of investigation that Life again dissipates into the analysis as a whole. There is 
discussion, but no controversy, in the sense that there is no polarization between Life and non-
Life. In the eighteenth century, with Stahl and Diderot, Life becomes a ‘crisis’ concept – with 
anti-reductionist and reductionist trajectories, respectively – until by the early nineteenth 
century it resolves into being a structural concept with no ontological component. This is 
patently the case in Claude Bernard – a careful reader of Diderot, who left behind an 
unpublished manuscript on the latter’s medical and physiological writings92 – for whom vitality 
is an effect of a particular type of physical organization, and nothing more: “l’élément ultime 
du phénomène est physique; l’arrangement est vital.”93
We could conclude, following a hint of François Duchesneau’s, that the concept of 
‘Life’ is an artificial construct, an être de raison created when rationality runs up against the 
speculative limits of a physiological theory that experience cannot wholly circumscribe.94 But 
what about the “revolutionary” force of epigenesis? The sense Diderot had that he and others 
were “on the verge of a great revolution in the sciences,” but not a revolution that was 
subsumed under an autonomous science of biology? It is this radical, ontologically 
controversial component of Life that I have discussed here.95
                                                 
92 Barral (1900). 
93 Bernard (1879), p. 524, cited and discussed in Métraux (2004), pp. 44-46. 
94 Duchesneau (1982), p. 487. 
95 This is part of a broader project to examine the relationship between materialism and embodiment in early 
modern science and the Enlightenment. 
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